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1 Introduction
A central question in the design of social and public policies is how to compare the
well-being of di¤erent beneciaries and how to identify the worst o¤. Indeed, the im-
plementation of redistributive policies such as poverty alleviation programs and targeted
social benet schemes requires a method to make interpersonal comparisons of well-being.
In practice, these comparisons rely almost exclusively on income as measure of individual
well-being. The worst o¤ are then identied as the persons with the lowest incomes.
This standard approach is attractive from a pragmatic and practical viewpoint, as
the analyst only needs information on the income position of the individuals. Yet, many
authors have pointed at the dark side of the practical appeal of income-based well-being
comparisons: income alone may be a too narrow information basis to measure well-being
attractively (see Stiglitz et al. (2010) for an extensive survey). Income-based well-being
comparisons assume that all individuals with the same income can be considered equally
well-o¤, irrespective of their non-monetary outcomes such as their health, educational
achievements, labor market status, and so on. It is by now well-documented in the
literature on subjective well-being that people care about these non-monetary dimensions
of their life (see Benjamin et al. (2012), Clark (frthc.), and Graham (frthc.)). Various
alternative approaches have therefore been proposed to perform well-being comparisons
with a broader and richer information basis (see Decancq et al. (frthc.) for a recent
overview).
A rst alternative approach is to use an objective composite well-being index to
aggregate the outcomes of the individuals in all di¤erent dimensions that constitute well-
being (see Hurka (frthc.) and Arneson (frthc.)). A popular example of a composite well-
being index is the Human Development Index (HDI). Similarly, most multidimensional
poverty measures are built on an objective view on how to aggregate across the di¤erent
dimensions of poverty (for a discussion of multidimensional poverty measurement, see
Alkire (frthc.); Chakravarty and Lugo (frthc.); Duclos and Tiberti (frthc.); and Pogge
and Wisor (frthc.)).
A second alternative is based on the idea that well-being comparisons should be based
on the subjective well-being scores reported by the concerned persons themselves. These
well-being scores can be obtained by asking respondents directly how well-o¤, happy or
satised with their life they are (see Clark (frthc.) and Dolan and Fujiwara (frthc.)). In
this approach, the problems of the selection of the relevant dimensions and the aggregation
procedure are left entirely to the respondents.
A third alternative uses the individual preferences, i.e., the opinions on the trade-o¤s
between the di¤erent aspects of well-being, to construct an interpersonally comparable
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measure of well-being. An example of such a well-being measure is the so-called equiva-
lent income measure (see Fleurbaey (frthc.); Maniquet (frthc.); as well as Fleurbaey and
Maniquet (2011)). Preference-based well-being measures require additional information
on the ordinal preferences or indi¤erence map of the concerned individuals, which typi-
cally is not readily available in existing data sets. As we will see below, indi¤erence maps
need therefore to be estimated.
A nal alternative considered here is to use the so-called von Neumann-Morgenstern
(vNM) utility function of the concerned individual to make well-being comparisons. As
was shown by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947), under some rationality conditions,
the preferences of the individuals over risky outcomes or lotteries can be represented by
the expected value of a vNM utility function. The idea of using this vNM utility function
to make interpersonal well-being comparisons goes back to Harsanyi (1953, 1955) and has
recently been advocated in the extended preferences approach of Adler (frthc.). Also this
vNM utility function needs to be estimated or calibrated.
We compare these four alternative well-being measures to the standard approach of
using income exclusively. We focus thereby on various issues that arise when operational-
izing the measures with a single data set, namely the German Socio-Economic Panel
(SOEP) of 2010. The SOEP is a widely used data set and contains detailed information
on various aspects of life for a representative sample of about 20,000 German citizens.
We compare the well-being measures in terms of the characteristics of the individuals in
the data set who belong to the bottom decile and can thus be considered as worst o¤.
We nd substantial di¤erences between the characteristics of the people at the bottom of
the well-being distribution according to the di¤erent measures. In addition, we nd a low
degree of overlap between the groups of worst-o¤ individuals according to the di¤erent
well-being measures and a considerable amount of re-ranking.
Our empirical results conrm ndings of other studies which are focusing on devel-
oping or transition countries. Laderchi et al. (2003), for instance, compare four di¤erent
underlying well-being measures when measuring poverty: a standard monetary one, a
measure based on the capability approach, a measure based on the notion of social ex-
clusion and, nally, a measure based on participatory approaches. The authors nd a
signicant lack of overlap between the approaches when measuring poverty in Peru and
India. Fleurbaey et al. (2009) compare the bottom of the well-being distribution in Rus-
sia according to income, life satisfaction and equivalent income and also nd low overlap
between the di¤erent groups.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the well-being measures and
discusses the required information to implement them empirically. Section 3 illustrates
how the measures can be implemented based on an existing household survey, namely the
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SOEP of 2010. In Section 4 we compare the characteristics of the worst o¤, quantify the
degree of overlap between the worst o¤ according to the di¤erent measures, and illustrate
the extent to which the ranking of the individuals di¤ers. Section 5 concludes.
2 Five well-being measures and their information re-
quirements
In this section we discuss ve operational well-being measures and their information re-
quirements. To do so, it is useful to make a distinction between four di¤erent pieces of
information that these measures can use as input.
First, let `i denote the vector of life aspects or attributes. This vector provides a
full description of the life of individual i covering the diversity of outcomes, activities and
possibilities enjoyed by the individual. In practice, however, the number of aspects of
life that can actually be included in an empirical analysis of well-being depends on the
data set at hand. In the next section we will illustrate that even with a state-of-the-art
and rich data set such as the SOEP, the data limitations constrain the scope of empirical
multidimensional analysis considerably.
Second, we assume that individuals have a well-informed opinion on what is a good
life. We represent this opinion for each individual i by an ordinal preference ordering Ri
over the vectors of life aspects `i. If individual i weakly prefers the life described by `i
to the life described by `0i; we write `iRi`0i: We denote strict preference by writing `iPi`0i;
and use `iIi`0i to refer to indi¤erence between `i and `0i. It is important to stress from
the outset that the preference ordering that we are considering here captures the well-
informed opinions on a good life of the individuals. This notion of a preference ordering
does not necessarily coincide with the preferences of the individuals that are revealed by
their behavior and choices, as these may incorporate information limitations and mistakes
(see, e.g., Hausman (2012)).
Third, individuals are equipped with a so-called von NeumannMorgenstern (vNM)
utility function, Vi. Such a cardinal vNM utility function Vi contains more information
about the individual than her ordinal preference ordering Ri; since the concavity or cur-
vature of the vNM utility function embeds additional information on her attitude towards
risk. We will see later that di¤erent approaches to well-being measurement disagree on
whether this additional cardinal information should be taken into account or not.
Finally, individuals are assumed to be able to attach a particular satisfaction score
si to their vectors of life aspects `i: The satisfaction function Si is the individual-specic
function that connects a satisfaction score to each `i, so that si = Si(`i). The satisfaction
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function may but is not required to represent the ordinal preference ordering of the
individual.
These four di¤erent pieces of well-being information are contained in the quadruple
(`i;Ri; Vi; Si). A well-being measureWB compares the quadruples across individuals and
attaches a numerical value to each of them. The numerical value WB(`i;Ri; Vi; Si) can
then be interpreted as a well-being measure of individual i with vector of life aspects `i,
preference ordering Ri; vNM utility function Vi and satisfaction function Si: Using such a
well-being measure for all individuals, the worst o¤ can be identied by simply looking at
the bottom of the well-being distribution. Not all well-being measures use all the infor-
mation available in the quadruple, and as we will see below di¤erent measures make
di¤erent use of the same information. These di¤erences reect the inherently normative
nature of well-being comparisons. In the remainder of this section we will compare ve
di¤erent well-being measures in detail.
2.1 Income
We assume that one of the outcomes in `i captures the command over material resources
of the individual. We will refer to that dimension as incomeand denote it yi, so that
`i = (yi; xi); where the vector xi = (x1i ; : : : ; x
m
i ) contains all the m non-income aspects of
life. Our rst method for interpersonal comparisons takes income yi as the only relevant
measure of well-being. That is, the well-being of individual i is measured by her income:
WB1(`i;Ri; Vi; Si) = yi: (1)
We use the label incomerather loosely as a placeholder for any interpersonal com-
parable measure capturing a persons command over material resources. The well-being
comparisons implicit in most of the literature on poverty and inequality measurement,
and in the design of (targeted) social policies are almost exclusively based on income in
one of its empirical manifestations such as measures of wealth, lifetime income, disposable
income or expenditures. Using disposable income, i.e., income after taxes and benets,
has become standard practice in European poverty and inequality measurement, for in-
stance. Each of these manifestations raises its own practical measurement problems (see
Cowell (2011) for a discussion).
A particularly pervasive measurement problem is that most operational income mea-
sures are collected at the household level, whereas one would like to make comparisons of
well-being between individuals (see Lewbel and Pendakur (2008) and Chiappori (frthc.)).
Two (heroic) assumptions are needed to move from the household level to the individ-
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ual one. First, an assumption is usually made on how incomes are distributed within
the household. Perfect income pooling is the standard assumption, although it is often
challenged by empirical evidence (see Lundberg et al. (1997), for instance). Second, an
assumption is needed on the extent to which resources held by the family can be commonly
used by its members, which generates economies of scale of living together. In practice,
the conversion from income information observed at the household level to the individual
level is made by rst dividing household incomes by an equivalence scale that is a concave
function of the household size and then by attributing the resulting equivalized incomes
equally to all members of the household.
Besides the measurement problems to collect the required information for this well-
being measure, another more fundamental objection has been raised. Using income as
measure of well-being assumes that all individuals with the same command of resources
are necessarily equally well-o¤. This position reduces the vector of all aspects of life
`i = (yi; xi) to a single measure of command over material resources yi, which implies
that all other aspects of life are deemed as irrelevant for well-being comparisons. Yet,
people may di¤er in how they manage to convert their resources into whatever they care
about in their life. Sen (1985), amongst others, has argued that income may indeed be
used as a means to generate well-being, but that reducing well-being to command over
material resources mixes up means and ends. Sen labelled this reductionist perspective
as resource fetishism. Neglecting the non-income components of `i, even as an operational
rst-order approximation of well-being, may therefore be far from harmless.
2.2 Composite index of well-being
A natural alternative to measuring well-being by looking at income alone, consists in
incorporating the other relevant aspects of life explicitly in the well-being analysis. By
doing so, the well-being analysis becomes multidimensional. There is a recent and growing
literature on multidimensional well-being and poverty measurement (see Weymark (2006)
and Chakravarty and Lugo (frthc.), for surveys).
A popular way to make multidimensional well-being comparisons is by constructing
a so-called dashboard of separate measures without aggregating them (see Ravallion
(2011) for a discussion). This procedure has some intuitive appeal as it allows to treat the
dimensions of life as incommensurable. Yet, these dimension-by-dimension comparisons of
well-being remain blind to the correlation between the dimensions. Moreover, well-being
comparisons between two individuals can only be robustly made when one individual is
worse o¤ in all dimensions of life, which we denote `i  `j. In reality, these cases of
so-called vector dominance are likely to be rare, especially when many dimensions are
6
included in the analysis. We consider this procedure therefore as a non-starter in our
quest for an operational multidimensional well-being measure that can be used for policy
making.
If we want to obtain a measure that is able to rank all persons with respect to their
well-being, we have to specify how to trade-o¤ a better score in one aspect of life (say
income) for a worse score in another aspect (say health). In other words, we have to select
a specic way to aggregate all the di¤erent aspects of `i. A composite well-being index is
a function CI that does precisely that. It is the second well-being measure that we will
discuss:
WB2(`i;Ri; Vi; Si) = CI(`i): (2)
As long as the composite well-being index CI is non-decreasing in each of its arguments,
comparisons based on the composite index will be consistent with the coarse ordering
imposed by vector dominance, i.e., if `i  `j then we obtain that CI (`i)  CI(`j):
In practice, most composite well-being indices t in the following general mathematical
structure:
CI(`i) =
h
w0
 
f 0 (yi)

+ w1
 
f 1
 
x1i

+   + wm (fm (xmi ))
i1=
: (3)
This structure reects the three choices that have to be made to obtain an opera-
tional composite index of well-being (see Decancq and Lugo (2013)). First, as the di¤er-
ent outcomes are often measured in di¤erent measurement units such as, e.g., income
in monetary units and schooling in years the outcomes need rst to be standardized to
a common basis before they can be sensibly aggregated. The dimension-specic trans-
formation functions f 0; f 1; : : : ; fm perform that standardization and, when desired, they
may transform the outcomes further to capture decreasing returns to well-being, for in-
stance. When the transformation functions are binary indicators taking 1 whenever the
outcome is below an exogenous cut-o¤ and 0 otherwise, CI becomes a counting measure,
which is larger when the individuals are deprived in more dimensions of life (see Atkin-
son (2003) and Alkire and Foster (2011) on the counting approach to multidimensional
poverty measurement).
Second, the weighting scheme w = (w0; w1; : : : ; wm) captures the relative weights
given to each of the dimensions. Various methods have been proposed to select the
most appropriate weighting scheme, ranging from explicitly normative approaches to com-
pletely data-driven ones (Decancq and Lugo (2013) provide a critical survey). In most
applications the weights are set equally or are determined by statistical or mathematical
algorithms such as Principal Component Analysis (PCA) that let the data speak for
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themselves. Brandolini (2007, p. 10), however, warns that we should be cautious in
entrusting a mathematical algorithm with a fundamentally normative task.
The parameter ; nally, captures the degree of substitutability between the dimen-
sions. Setting  equal to 1 leads to a simple additive aggregation which is most popular
and allows for perfect substitutability between the transformed outcomes. When  is set
equal to 1 and the weights are furthermore chosen to be equal, the composite index of
well-being becomes an unweighted average of the standardized outcomes in all dimen-
sions. Until 2010, the popular Human Development Index (HDI) followed this simple
structure to aggregate average income, life expectancy and educational achievements for
each country (see Ravallion (2012) for a critical appraisal of the trade-o¤s implicit in the
HDI).
An important feature of composite indices is that the same index is used to aggregate
the outcomes for all individuals. This means that the same opinion on how the di¤erent
aspects of life should be traded-o¤ is used to evaluate the well-being of all individuals:
Various approaches can be followed to obtain a universal opinion on how the dimensions of
life should be aggregated and traded-o¤. First, this opinion may reect a single objective
or perfectionist account of the good life, for which inspiration can be found in the work
of Aristotle, for instance (see Hurka (frthc.) for a discussion). Alternatively, the common
trade-o¤s may be determined in a democratic process through public reasoning (as ad-
vocated by Sen (2004)). Yet, whenever some disagreement exists on the precise content
of the objective theory on the good life, or whenever a consensus cannot be reached on
how to aggregate the di¤erent aspects of life, the well-being of some individuals is judged
according to an opinion on the good life which is not their own. In other words, it can
happen that `iPi`0i whereas CI(`i) < CI(`0i): In these cases, the well-being comparison
(and the policies relying on it) are said to be paternalistic.
2.3 Subjective well-being measure
An alternative to an objective and universal composite well-being index is to rely on a
subjective well-being measure. A simple way to do that is to directly ask the concerned
persons how well-o¤ they consider themselves, by asking them about their life satisfaction,
for instance. The responses are then immediately used as measure of well-being. In our
framework, we say that the well-being of individual i is measured by:
WB3(`i;Ri; Vi; Si) = Si(`i); (4)
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where Si is the individual-specic satisfaction function that attaches a particular satisfac-
tion score si to each vector of life aspects `i. This is the third well-being measure that we
discuss. Satisfaction scores are relatively easy to collect (see OECD (2013) for a detailed
discussion) and hence they are becoming increasingly available for many countries of the
world (see Helliwell et al. (2013) for a global comparison of subjective well-being data).
A subjective well-being measure o¤ers a practical and easily implementable tool for well-
being comparisons. To evaluate its normative appeal, however, it is useful to open the
black box of the satisfaction function a bit further.
We decompose the satisfaction function into an answer to two di¤erent problems (see
also Fleurbaey and Blanchet (2013, p. 175)). First, the individual ranks her life described
by `i relative to one or more reference lives (the ranking problem). Second, she translates
this ranking into a verbal statement or numerical value on the scale of the survey (the
calibration problem). This calibration may depend on so-called scaling factors, such as
the interpretation of the verbal labels in the question, the expectations and aspirations
of the respondents, the extent to which they have adapted to their situation, and various
other personality traits.
Two important versions of the subjective well-being approach exist, depending on
which information is used in the ranking problem. In the rst version, the individuals are
assumed to consider only their a¤ects (feelings, emotions) when ranking di¤erent vectors
of life aspects. A¤ects come in a permanent ow when individuals are awake. This version
is the so-called hedonic variant of the subjective well-being approach, which argues that
what matters for well-being comparisons are the a¤ects of people (see Haybron (frthc.) for
a discussion). It brings us to a modern version of the traditional Benthamite utilitarian
calculus of the 18th century that aims to assure maximum happiness to the maximum
number of peoplewhere happiness is understood as reecting feelings of pleasure and
pain. More recently, Layard (2005, p. 121), writes: Ethical theory should focus on what
people feel, rather than what other people think is good for them. In its hedonic variant,
the function Si is only sensitive to one aspect of `i, i.e., the a¤ects of the individual.
Relying exclusively on a¤ects may seem again a rather narrow basis for interpersonal
comparisons of well-being (see Nussbaum (2008)).
In the second version, the ranking depends on the cognitive valuations that are formed
by the individuals themselves when they take some distance to formulate a judgment over
their life. One may wonder whether this version of the subjective well-being approach
respects the preferences of the concerned individuals. When satisfaction scores are aligned
with the ordinal preferences (i.e., when the so-called consistency assumption holds) we
have that Si (`i)  Si (`0i) if and only if `iRi`0i, so that the subjective well-being approach
indeed respects individual preferences when making intrapersonal comparisons. However,
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this result does not extend to the interpersonal comparisons that we are interested in. It
may very well be the case that both individuals i and j have the same preference ordering
and both strictly prefer the situation of individual i, whereas still Si (`i) < Sj (`j) holds:
Indeed, both individuals may use a di¤erent calibration of their subjective well-being, so
that individual j still reports a higher life satisfaction score even when they both agree
that individual i is in a better situation (see also Fleurbaey et al. (2009) for a discussion).
The reason why these reversals may occur is reminiscent of Sens (1985) argument of
physical condition neglect against subjective well-being approaches. Person j may be sat-
ised with her life as she has adapted to her bad living conditions (Sen gives the example
of a happy, but battered housewife). Person i, on the contrary, may have some expensive
tasteswhich make her less satised even in an unanimously preferred situation. Arrow
(1973, p. 254) famously refers to a person who has cultivated a taste for prephylloxera
claret and plovers eggs. See Graham (2009) and Di Tella et al. (2010) for some illus-
trations that these examples of adaptation and expensive tastes may occur in reality and
are not mere theoretical curiosa.
2.4 Equivalent income
We have seen that objective composite indices of well-being are paternalistic since they
may go against the individuals own preferences on what is a good life. On the other
side of the spectrum, we have seen that subjective well-being measures respect prefer-
ences in intrapersonal comparisons, but may go against the unanimous preferences of the
concerned individuals in interpersonal comparisons. A natural question at this point is
whether an approach can be conceived that respects unanimous preferences in interper-
sonal comparisons.
The equivalent income approach is a method that aims to do that. Computing
equivalent incomes has a long pedigree in economics (for more details see Fleurbaey (2009),
and Fleurbaey (frthc.)). The equivalent income of an individual i is the hypothetical
income yi that, if combined with a reference value ex on all non-income dimensions, would
place the individual in a situation that she nds equally good as her initial situation.
Formally, we say that:
WB4(`i;Ri; Vi; Si) = yi such that (yi; xi) Ii (yi ; ex) : (5)
This is the fourth measure of well-being considered. The equivalent income measure
respects unanimous preferences on what is a good life in interpersonal comparisons. When
both individuals i and j have the same preference ordering and strictly prefer the situation
10
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O income
Figure 1: Measuring well-being with an equivalent income approach
of individual i, we obtain indeed that yi > y

j .
Figure 1 illustrates the equivalent income measure for individuals i and j. For this
illustration, we assume that there are only two life aspects: income and health. The
vectors of life aspects of both individuals are depicted in the gure by means of `i and
`j. Individual j is richer, but in worse health than individual i: For each individual,
the indi¤erence curve through her actual vector of life aspects is also shown. It is clear
that both individuals have di¤erent opinions on the good life, as their indi¤erence curves
cross. Individual j has a atterindi¤erence curve, which means that individual j cares
more about her health. The horizontal line in the graph represents the reference value
for health, eh; the non-income dimension. The equivalent income of each individual can
be obtained as the income level that, if combined with the reference value for health, is
considered by the individual herself as equally good as her current vector of life aspects.
These bundles are depicted by means of `0i and `
0
j in Figure 1.
From Figure 1 it is clear that the equivalent income depends on the choice of the
reference values in the non-income dimensions (indeed, if the reference value was below
the crossing of the indi¤erence curves of i and j in Figure 1, their well-being ranking would
have been reversed). The choice of the reference values depends on the value judgments
of the social observer on how interpersonal comparisons of well-being should be made.
Fleurbaey and Blanchet (2013, p. 250) provide some guidelines on how the reference
values can be chosen. One observes that for all individuals who obtain the reference
value in the non-income dimensions xi = ex, the equivalent income yi equals the actual
income yi and does not depend on the preferences at all (these cases correspond to `0i and
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`0j in Figure 1). Inverting this reasoning, it follows that the reference values in the non-
income dimensions should be chosen so that the well-being of individuals who obtain the
reference value can be evaluated by only looking at their income. Consequently, when the
non-income dimensions have a value that everybody aspires to such as being in perfect
health, or not being unemployed it seems natural to take that value as reference value.
In the case where the respondent is not at the reference value in the non-income
dimensions, the equivalent income level can be obtained from her actual income level,
after adjusting for the gap between the outcomes for the non-income dimensions and the
respective reference values. This gap in the non-income dimensions is valued in monetary
units by using the personal willingness-to-pay (WTP). On the horizontal axis of Figure
1, the WTP of individual i to be in perfect health can be read as the distance between
yi and yi . It is clearly smaller than the WTP of individual j who is in worse health and
moreover cares more about health. Despite the use of a monetary measurement unit, the
equivalent income method does not su¤er from the resource fetishism critique formulated
earlier because of the important role that is played by the outcomes in the non-income
dimensions. Using a monetary measurement unit o¤ers practical advantages as it allows
to use existing results from the literature on income inequality and poverty measurement
(see Cowell (frthc.)) when it comes to aggregating the well-being of di¤erent individuals
in the society.
It is clear that well-being comparisons by means of the equivalent income method are
not necessarily consistent with the idea that an individual who scores better on all aspects
of life is considered to be better o¤ (consider, for instance, a point on the indi¤erence
curve of individual i to the south-west of `j in Figure 1). In that case, we could have
vector dominance `i  `j while we still obtain that yi > yj . This is a consequence of the
desire to respect individual preferences, which is central to the equivalent income method.
According to this view, an individual who scores higher on all aspects of life may care
more about his relative hardships than another individual who is worse o¤ in all aspects.
Choosing between the conicting principle of respecting preferences, on the one hand, and
the idea that vector dominance leads to higher well-being, on the other hand, appears
to be one of the hard decisions to be made when evaluating multidimensional well-being
(see Brun and Tungodden (2004)). Observers who prefer the latter principle of vector
dominance, will have to rely on an objective and universal measure such as a composite
well-being index, which, however, does not necessarily respect individual preferences and
is therefore paternalistic.
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2.5 von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
An equivalent income measure is aligned with the ordinal preferences of the individuals,
irrespective of the cardinal values given by the individuals to their indi¤erence curves.
Some authors have argued that a method which only depends on ordinal preferences,
does not incorporate enough information about the well-being of the respondents. When
discussing so-called economic quantity indices, the broad family of well-being measures
to which equivalent income belongs, Sen (1979, p.11) writes: A variation of ones in-
tensities of pleasure or welfare cannot, therefore, nd any reection in this numbering
system as long as the ordering remains unchanged (see also Fleurbaey and Blanchet
(2013, p.122) for a discussion). Besides information on the intensities of pleasure of the
concerned individuals, one may also want to incorporate other cardinal information, such
as the individual attitudes towards risk.
The extended preference approach which has been recently proposed by Matthew
Adler allows to do that (see Adler (2012, 2014) and Adler (frthc.), for more details). The
approach has its origin in Harsanyis works (1953, 1955, 1977). Extended preferences
are preferences of the deliberator or social observer k over histories, which are pairs
consisting of a vector of life aspects and an individual who obtains this vector of life
aspects. We will implement what Adler (frthc.) describes as the sovereignty respecting
version of the simple case of the extended preference approach. In this case, the deliberator
k respects Ri when evaluating `i for individual i. When formulating his measure of well-
being, the deliberator k respects the preferences of the individuals over risky outcomes
or lotteries, which under some rationality conditions can be expectationally represented
by a vNM utility function Vi (see von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947)). Next, to
obtain an interpersonally comparable well-being measure, we suppose that the deliberator
normalizes the individual vNM utilities so that well-being for all individuals equals 0 and 1
in two selected calibration vectors `+; `++. Adler o¤ers this as one approach to normalizing
di¤erent vNM functions, but notes that other approaches are also possible. We obtain:
WB5(`i;Ri; Vi; Si) = Vi(`i)  Vi(`
+)
Vi(`++)  Vi(`+) : (6)
This measure is the fth and nal measure of well-being that we discuss. To implement
it, one needs to know the individual-specic von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
Vi and, moreover, the deliberator needs to select the two calibration vectors `+ and `++
where all individuals have the same well-being, irrespective of their preferences: The
choice of the calibration points is again a value judgment. The origin or a bundle of
extremepoverty seems a natural candidate for the rst calibration vector `+, and, e.g.,
an ordinarypoverty bundle or the maximum vector of life aspects can be selected as a
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second calibration vector `++:We set `+ at the origin and `++ at the maximum vector of
life aspects.
Figure 2 presents a graphical example of the well-being measure based on the vNM
utility function. In the left hand-panel, the same individuals i and j of Figure 1 are de-
picted again, with their vectors of life aspects `i and `j and indi¤erence curves, as well
as the two calibration vectors `+ and `++. The well-being measure WB5 is shown on the
vertical axis in the right hand panel. The horizontal axis of the right hand panel corre-
sponds to the dotted ray between `+ and `++ in the left hand panel. We depict also the
vectors of life aspects `0i and `
0
j, which are obtained at the intersection of this dotted line
and the indi¤erence curves. The gray curve in the right hand panel depicts the case of a
risk-neutral vNM utility function along the ray between `+ and `++, and the black curve
a risk-averse vNM utility function along the same ray. One easily checks in Figure 2 that
individual i is ranked as worse o¤ compared to individual j when both individuals have
the same risk aversion (WBRAi < WB
RA
j as well as WB
RN
i < WB
RN
j ). Note, however,
that this ranking is opposite to the ranking according to the equivalent incomes in Figure
1, where we obtained yj < y

i ; even if exactly the same outcome bundles and ordinal
preferences are used. Relying on a di¤erent cardinalization of the ordinal preferences,
may indeed lead to a re-ranking of the individuals when their indi¤erence curves cross.
In the empirical part we illustrate the empirical relevance of this phenomenon. Moreover,
assuming that individual i is risk averse and individual j risk neutral, it can be seen from
the gure that the ranking of both individuals according to WB5 is reversed again, with
WBRNj < WB
RA
i . This observation highlights the important role of risk aversion when
making well-being comparisons based on vNM utility functions. For a more extensive dis-
cussion about whether risk aversion is relevant to well-being comparisons, see the chapters
by Adler (frthc.) and Fleurbaey (frthc.).
Finally, it is clear that preference-based methods such as equivalent incomes and the
vNM utility function pose formidable data requirements: for each person in the data set,
at least information is needed on the shape of her indi¤erence curve. This information is
typically not readily available. In the next section, we discuss various strategies how the
necessary preference information can be elicited or estimated.
3 Implementation of the well-being measures with
German data
We illustrate how the di¤erent measures can be implemented using a single data set,
namely the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). The SOEP is a representative house-
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Figure 2: Measuring well-being with the extended preference approach
hold survey of the German population which is conducted yearly since 1984 (see Wagner
et al. (2007) for more details). For the empirical illustration, we use the data of 2010 and
focus on the subpopulation of individuals who are at least 25 years old and for whom we
have data for all necessary variables. This leaves us with a sample of 14,027 individuals,
living in 8,657 households. Various studies have used the SOEP to study subjective well-
being and its determinants (see, e.g., Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), Ferrer-i-Carbonell and
Frijters (2004), Frijters et al. (2004b, 2004a), and Layard et al. (2008)).
In this section, we rst describe the information contained in the vector of life aspects
`i; which can be readily obtained from the data set, and then we turn to the estimation
of the preferences Ri: Finally, we discuss the computation of the ve well-being measures
introduced in the previous section.
3.1 Observed outcomes in three dimensions of well-being
Given the data limitations imposed by our data set, we assume that the vector of life
aspects `i that describes the life aspects of the individual i has three dimensions: income
(yi), health (hi), and labor market status (ui), so that `i = (yi; hi; ui). These three
dimensions belong to the set of eight dimensions suggested by Stiglitz et al. (2010).
Clearly, it is only a limited set of dimensions of well-being, so that our analysis inevitably
remains at a broad-brush level. However, the data set does not permit us to go much
further and to include in a satisfactory way other potentially relevant dimensions such
as social interactions, political freedom and liberties, safety and security, etc. We do not
include education as a dimension of life, even though the data set would allow us to. We
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return later in this section to this issue.
Income is measured by monthly equivalized disposable income. This income measure
is based on the total monthly income of a household after including the received benets
and subtracting the taxes paid. As discussed in the previous section, disposable income
is observed at the household level, whereas individual information is desired. To account
for household size, we divide total income by the so-called modied OECD equivalence
scale, which attaches a weight of 1 to the household head, 0.5 to each additional adult
household member and 0.3 to children. The resulting equivalized total income is then
equally attributed to all household members, assuming full income pooling. It is important
to distinguish between the notion of equivalent income, dened in the previous section as a
preference-based measure of well-being, and equivalized income, which is income corrected
for household size by means of an equivalence scale (Decancq et al. (frthc.) discuss the
relation between the two notions).
To measure the health of the individuals, the SOEP allows two strategies to be fol-
lowed. First, respondents of the SOEP have been asked to assess their overall health level
on a scale between 1 and 5. This so-called self-assessed health is documented to be a good
predictor for overall health status or longevity in other surveys (see, e.g., van Doorslaer
and Jones (2003)). Yet, similarly to subjective well-being scores, the self-assessed health
status of an individual may depend on personality traits and other scaling factors (Jürges
(2007)). We opt therefore for a second strategy which involves the construction of an
objective health index. The SOEP data set contains a set of indicators of health problems
such as disability status, the number of visits to the doctor, presence of constraints in
daily and social life through the prevalence of pain, etc. We derive the weights of the indi-
cators in the objective health index from the coe¢ cients of a regression with self-assessed
health as dependent variable and the indicators as explanatory variables (van Doorslaer
and Jones (2003) provide a comparison of this procedure with other health indices). The
index is then normalized to a scale between 0 and 100. Since only health problems are
taken into account, the value of 100 can be interpreted as perfect health (which is
reached by about 9% of the individuals in the considered sample).
Labor market status is measured by a binary variable taking 1 whenever the respon-
dent is unemployed. Labor market status has been found to be an important determinant
of subjective well-being (see, e.g., Clark and Oswald (1994), Clark et al. (2001) and
Luechinger et al. (2010)). Yet, a binary employment indicator can be argued to be a
rather crude measure of the labor market status of an individual (see Schokkaert et al.
(2011) for a preference-sensitive multidimensional measure of job quality, for instance).
In the considered sample (including pensioners), 6.4% of the sample is registered as un-
employed. This number is a bit lower than the o¢ cial unemployment rate of Germany in
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2010, when 7.7% of the total labor force was unemployed. Unemployment is traditionally
higher in East (12.0%) than in West Germany (6.6%), but was slightly lower for young
people aged 15-25 (6.8%) in 2010 (Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2014)).
3.2 Estimating indi¤erence maps with life satisfaction data
To compute the preference-sensitive well-being measuresWB4 andWB5 introduced in the
previous section, additional information on the preference ordering of the concerned indi-
viduals is necessary. In general, three approaches can be followed to retrieve information
on preferences (see Decancq et al. (frthc.) and Adler (2013) for a discussion).
First, in a stated-preference approach, the respondents are asked directly about the
trade-o¤s between income and the non-income dimensions of well-being, for instance by us-
ing contingent valuation techniques. This method has been used mainly in two-dimensional
well-being comparisons involving income and health. Fleurbaey et al. (2013) have used
the stated-preference approach to calculate equivalent incomes for income-health combi-
nations with specic and tailored survey data in France. In general, stated-preference
questions are only rarely asked in standard household surveys and are also not avail-
able in the SOEP. One reason is that contingent valuation techniques may be cognitively
challenging for the respondents, especially when many dimensions are involved.
A second approach aims at inferring preferences from observed behavior and choices
made by the respondents. Consequently, such a revealed preference method is only ap-
plicable to dimensions over which individuals do actually make choices. Bargain et al.
(2013) and Decoster and Haan (frthc.) infer indi¤erence maps from an econometrically
estimated labor supply model in which agents choose optimally between various income-
leisure combinations under a budget constraint. Revealed preference methods have the
disadvantage that possible decision errors will be incorporated in the actual preferences
of the individuals. Moreover, this method is not directly applicable on the SOEP for the
dimensions of interest, because choices over these dimensions are not observed.
We opt therefore for a third method, namely to estimate the preferences using self-
reported life satisfaction. There is a tradition in economics of estimating trade-o¤s between
monetary and non-monetary dimensions of well-being based on life satisfaction data (see
Clark and Oswald (2002) and the references therein; Dolan and Fujiwara (frthc.) provide a
critical discussion). Fleurbaey et al. (2009), Decancq and Schokkaert (2013) and Decancq
et al. (2014) provide other examples of using this method to measure well-being, social
progress and poverty respectively. Benjamin et al. (frthc.) compare marginal rates
of substitution between life satisfaction and revealed preference rankings for residency
choices.
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Under the consistency assumption, the satisfaction scores contain information on
the preference ordering and shape of the indi¤erence curves of the individuals. Yet,
as we have seen, the reported satisfaction scores depend also on the individual-specic
scaling factors such as the aspiration level and interpretation of the verbal labels in the
question, which determine the label or cardinal level attributed to the indi¤erence curves.
As these scaling factors may be correlated with the variables of interest such as income
and health, the estimation of the e¤ect of these variables on life satisfaction may be
biased. Therefore, the e¤ect of the scaling factors must ideally be controlled for. Examples
of such scaling factors are the e¤ect of age and education on life satisfaction. The U-
shaped e¤ect of age is a widely documented nding in cross-section satisfaction studies
and remains signicant even after controlling for the usual determinants of life satisfaction
such as income, health, marital status and unemployment (see Gwozdz and Sousa-Poza
(2010) and Van Landeghem (2012) for a discussion of the age e¤ect on life satisfaction
in Germany). In our analysis with the control variables discussed below, we nd that
German respondents reach their lowest life satisfaction around the age of 47. This pattern
is consistent with an intuition that individuals report life satisfaction scores based on a
comparison of the realized outcomes with the outcomes to which they aspire. Around the
middle of their adult life, respondents may adjust their aspiration level downwards (to a
more realistic level) so that afterwards they report higher life satisfaction for the same or
even worse vectors of life aspects. Contrarily, higher education may adjust the aspiration
level upwards, and hence reduce life satisfaction for the same or even better vectors of life
aspects. To lter out this and similar scaling factors, we make use of a regression model.
We start from a satisfaction regression with self-reported life satisfaction si as the
explained variable and a series of usual explanatory variables, including the three dimen-
sions of life: income yi, health hi, unemployment ui. We also include a vector of observable
socio-demographic characteristics zi including age, education, marital status and regional
dummies (at the Länder level). In addition, we include three additional control vari-
ables in the regression to capture personality traits. Personality traits are generally found
to be important determinants of life satisfaction, constituting a large part of individual
heterogeneity. If panel data are available, it is therefore a common practice to include
individual xed e¤ects in the regression to control for time-invariant (unobserved) char-
acteristics of the respondents such as their personality traits (see, e.g., Ferrer-i-Carbonell
and Frijters (2004) and Frijters et al. (2004a, 2004b) for examples using the SOEP).
Yet, there is a price to be paid for the inclusion of these xed e¤ects as they will control
for all the time-invariant characteristics of the individuals, including the time-invariant
dimensions that may be of interest. Furthermore, they might bias the estimated e¤ect of
variables with low within-person variation (Boyce (2010)). As we work here with a single
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cross section of the data set we can not include individual xed e¤ects, but rather use
three self-reported personality traits as controls in the regression (Anand et al. (2009) and
Boyce (2010) discuss this approach in detail). In 2010, a limited set of questions concern-
ing personality traits was included in the SOEP. We include three aspects, namely the
extent to which respondents i) consider to have control over their life, ii) think to have
achieved what they deserve and iii) report a positive attitude towards themselves.
Bringing everything together, we obtain the following standard life satisfaction model:
si =  + yi + hi + ui + zi + "i; (7)
where ; ; ; ;  are coe¢ cients to be estimated and "i an error term. The coe¢ cients
;  and  capture the trade-o¤s or marginal rates of substitution between the dimensions
in which we are interested. These coe¢ cients provide us with the necessary information
to plot a linear indi¤erence map of each individual: Note that the constant, the error
term, and the vector of socio-demographic characteristics are irrelevant for the marginal
rates of substitution between the dimensions.
The method requires us to classify every variable as a dimension of life or as a scaling
factor. As discussed above, a variable like education, however, can be argued to be a
dimension of life and a scaling factor. Unfortunately, both e¤ects cannot be disentangled
econometrically. We choose here to treat education as a scaling factor and hence we
cannot include it as a dimension of life.
Given the linear specication of the standard model, all estimated indi¤erence curves
will be linear and parallel, leading to constant trade-o¤s between the dimensions. This
clearly is an unattractive feature of the standard model. A few renements are there-
fore necessary to obtain more realistic preferences and to allow for heterogeneity in the
estimated trade-o¤s.
First, we allow the ;  and s to di¤er across groups of individuals with the same
socio-demographic background. This can be achieved by including interaction e¤ects be-
tween the well-being dimensions and some variables that capture the socio-demographic
background of the individuals. In our illustration we allow for di¤erent coe¢ cients for
di¤erent socio-demographic groups depending on whether the respondent lives with a
partner, is male, and belongs to the age group 45-60 or not. Let g; g and g refer to the
coe¢ cients of income, health and unemployment of the socio-demographic group g.
Second, the marginal rates of substitution between the dimensions may not be con-
stant. Indeed, the increase in income that is necessary to keep life satisfaction unchanged
after a decrease in health, may depend on the level of income and health of the individ-
ual. For that reason, the dimensions are transformed by means of a so-called Box-Cox
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transformation, f (x) = (x   1) =, with the parameter  capturing the concavity of the
transformed function (see Box and Cox (1964) for an extensive treatment). For  equal to
1, the Box-Cox transformation is linear. The transformation function f is strictly concave
when  < 1. The lower the parameter  is, the more concave the function becomes. As
unemployment is a binary variable, we do not transform unemployment. The resulting,
rened, satisfaction model then becomes:
si =  + g
y
y
i   1
y
+ g
h
h
i   1
h
+ gui + zi + "i; (8)
where y and h are the parameters of the Box-Cox transformation for income and health,
respectively. All parameters of the model are jointly estimated by maximum likelihood
estimation assuming a normal distribution of the error term. The estimation results
according to this rened model can be found in Table 1. The table has ve parts.
The rst part shows the coe¢ cients of the well-being dimensions yi; hi; and ui. The
three rows give the e¤ect of the outcomes in the dimensions on life satisfaction for members
of the reference socio-demographic group (who do not live with a partner, are female,
and are between 45 and 60 years old). The coe¢ cients have the expected sign and are
statistically signicant at the 5% level. In the interpretation of the magnitude of the
coe¢ cients of income and health, one has to take account of the Box-Cox transformation.
The next three rows show the interaction e¤ects of income with the three binary
indicators capturing the socio-demographic group to which the respondent belongs. We
see that respondents living with a partner have a higher coe¢ cient of income compared to
the reference group (the income coe¢ cient of those respondents equals 0:1747 = 0:150 +
0:0247), while the coe¢ cient of the male respondents is smaller. All three interaction
e¤ects are quantitatively modest but statistically signicant at the 0.1% level, which
indicates moderate but relevant heterogeneity in preferences. Interactions between these
three binary socio-demographic indicators and health and unemployment are mostly found
to be insignicant and have been dropped to obtain a parsimonious model, so that g = 
and g =  for all groups g in equation (8).
In the next two rows, the parameters of the Box-Cox transformation of income and
the health index are reported. They are found to be slightly lower for income than for
the health index (0.114 and 0.233 respectively), indicating somewhat stronger decreasing
returns for income than for health, which stands to reason (the magnitude of y is in line
with the literature: Becker et al. (2005) calibrate it at a level of 0:2 and Layard et al.
(2008) estimate it to be around 0:26).
[Table 1 about here]
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The fourth part of the table highlights the e¤ect of the control variables age, age
squared, an indicator of higher education, and three marital status variables. The re-
gional dummies are not shown for lack of space (7 out of the 15 dummies are statistically
signicant at the 5% level). All three personality variables have a positive and statisti-
cally signicant e¤ect on life satisfaction. The strongest e¤ect can be observed for having
a positive attitude.
One nal remark needs to be made about the last part of Table 1. The pseudo R2 of
this and similar life satisfaction regressions tends to be rather low (see, Graham (2004) for
other examples), which indicates that the actual preferences are still largely determined
by unobserved factors which are not captured by our econometric model. However, it can
be argued that these actual preferences of the individuals are too idiosyncratic to be nor-
matively compelling and should be laundered before they can be used in the construction
of a well-being measure (see Decancq et al. (2014)). By using only the average pref-
erences of the socio-demographic group to which the individual belongs, the estimation
procedure provides such a laundering procedure. If the sample size would have allowed
a more ne-grained classication in subgroups, however, that would certainly have been
desirable.
3.3 Computing the well-being measures
The rst well-being measureWB1 coincides with household equivalized disposable income,
which can be readily obtained from the data set, after adjusting it for the household size
as discussed above. We focus therefore on the implementation of the other well-being
measures.
To compute the composite well-being index WB2, choices have to be made on the
dimension-specic transformation functions, on the degree of substitutability, and on the
weighting scheme. Income is rst transformed by means of a logarithmic transformation
to capture the decreasing marginal e¤ect of income on well-being. All dimensions have
been normalized to a scale between 0 and 1 and then aggregated additively (i.e. we
set  = 1 in equation (3)): We use principal component analysis (PCA) to obtain the
weighting scheme from the data (see Ram (1982) and Nguefack-Tsague et al. (2011) for
a defense of this method). The weighting scheme w = (0:41; 0:24; 0:35) consists of the
normalized loadings of the rst principal component of the original data and provides the
linear combination that captures the maximal variance of the original variables: We nd
that the PCA method attributes a larger weight to income and a lower weight to health
compared to equal weighting. The resulting composite index has an average value of 0.83
and ranges between 0.25 and 0.99 in the sample.
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For the subjective well-being measure WB3, we use observed life satisfaction si (the
same variable that we used as dependent variable in the regression discussed in the previ-
ous subsection). This variable is measured by the following question (after translation):
To what extent are you satised with your life in general at the present time?. Respon-
dents attach a score from 0 (not satised at all) to 10 (completely satised) to the
question. The wording of this question invites the respondent to make a cognitive valua-
tion of her life. Yet, we do not know how the respondents have precisely interpreted the
question. In 2010, the SOEP also contains some information on a¤ects, namely respon-
dents are asked how frequently they felt sad during the last 4 weeks and how frequently
they felt happy. Respondents reply on a 1 to 5 scale in both cases. In order to compare
life satisfaction scores and a¤ects, we also construct an admittedly crude measure of
the hedonic owin a Benthamite spirit by subtracting the frequency of feeling sad from
the frequency of feeling happy (see Kahnemann and Krueger (2006) for a discussion of
more sophisticated methods). This constructed a¤ect measure ranges on a scale from -4
to 4. The Spearman rank correlation between the life satisfaction variable and the a¤ect
measure is relatively high (0.50) and signicantly di¤erent from 0. Whether this corre-
lation suggests that positive a¤ects are an important component of life satisfaction or
that respondents do not distinguish clearly between questions about a¤ects and cognitive
valuations, is unclear however.
We compute for each individual her equivalent income WB4 by solving equation (5)
using the shape of the indi¤erence maps estimated with the procedure described in the
previous subsection. To do so, we need to select the reference value of the non-income
dimensions. As discussed above, it is intuitive to take for each dimension the best possible
or the value that people aspires to. We use the estimated indi¤erence curves to look for
the best possible value for all socio-demographic groups. All socio-demographic groups
have well-behaved monotonic preferences and we select the highest value as reference, i.e.,
a value of 100 for the objective health indicator (meaning perfect health or absence of any
health problem) and not being unemployed. The reference values are reached by about
9% of our sample for health, and by 94% for unemployment.
For the implementation of the nal preference measure WB5 we need additional
information on the vNM utility function of the individuals. Estimating vNM utility func-
tions requires information on the preferences of the individuals over lotteries of vectors of
life aspects. Unfortunately, this information is not available in the data set. To illustrate
the role of the risk attitude when using this well-being measure, however, we calibrate the
vNM utility functions based on some other information on the risk attitude reported by
the respondents. In its 2010 wave, the SOEP contains a question on the personal willing-
ness to take risks, in which respondents classify themselves on a scale with 11 categories,
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ranging from no willingness to take risksto very willing to take risks. With respect
to our measure WB5, we interpret the answers of the respondents as their willingness to
take risks in lotteries of vectors of life aspects on a path between the reference vectors `+
and `++. We classify the respondents as either being risk neutral or risk averse through a
median split of the risk attitude variable. The risk neutral respondents are then equipped
with the following vNM utility function:
Vi(yi; hi; ui) = g
y
y
i   1
y
+ g
h
h
i   1
h
+ gui; (9)
with the parameters as reported in Table 1. This vNM utility function equals the rened
satisfaction regression net of the scaling factors (as one notices from comparing equations
(8) and (9)). The underlying ordinal preferences are hence the same as those that are used
for the derivation of the equivalent income measureWB4: For the risk averse respondents,
we take a mildly concave Box-Cox transformation of equation (9) with the concavity
parameter calibrated at the value of 0:8: This procedure results in a situation similar to
the right hand panel of Figure 2 where half of the sample is considered to be risk neutral
(using the linear gray curve to attribute well-being level to the indi¤erence curves) and
half of the sample is risk averse (using the concave black curve). Using the appropriate
vNM utility function for each individual, we compute WB5 using equation (6), with `+
equal to the origin and `++ equal to the maximumvector of life aspects with income
equal to 25,000 euro per month, health equal to 100, and the employment status being
not unemployed. As mentioned above, this is only one of the possible choices for `+ and
`++.
4 Empirical comparison of the well-being measures
In this section we empirically compare the di¤erent well-being measures by taking three
di¤erent perspectives. First, we look at the characteristics of the individuals who are
identied as worst o¤ according to the ve measures, then we study the degree of overlap
across the groups identied as worst o¤and, nally, we discuss the re-ranking between the
di¤erent well-being measures taking into account the full sample. The rst two perspec-
tives are especially relevant from a policy perspective when it comes to targeting the worst
o¤ in a society. The last perspective is relevant for the implementation of (progressive)
redistribution, which requires a ranking of all individuals in a society.
Before starting the analysis of the worst o¤, we need to decide on the size of the
group that we are referring to as worst o¤. Empirically, it seems not to make much
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sense to focus on a single worst o¤ respondent from the sample or on a very small group.
On the other hand, the group should be small enough to capture what is going on at
the bottom of the distribution without being biased by the outcomes of the better o¤.
Focussing on the bottom decile seems a reasonable compromise to us. To be precise, we
focus on the bottom 9.2 % of the population (which corresponds to the percentage of
respondents reporting a life satisfaction lower or equal than 4 on the scale between 0 and
10). It is important to stress that our analysis of the characteristics of the bottom tail
of the well-being distribution is di¤erent from a standard poverty analysis in which an
exogenous (absolute or relative) poverty line is used to identify the poor. In an extremely
rich society there will be a group of people identied as worst o¤, and vice versa in a poor
society there may be more people being identied as poor than the group we classify here
as the worst o¤.
Various other recent studies have used the SOEP to study well-being and poverty:
Clark et al. (2013) and dAmbrosio and Frick (2007) investigate the link between subjec-
tive well-being and income poverty, Juhasz (2012) discusses so-called satisfaction based
poverty measures, and Rippin (frthc.) compares income and multidimensional poverty
in Germany.
4.1 Portrait of the worst o¤
Table 2 is the central table of this section and shows a portrait of the worst o¤. The
right hand columns of the table correspond to the ve well-being measures. The rows are
classied into three parts. The rst four rows show life satisfaction as well as the three
outcome variables. The second part of the table reports various socio-demographic vari-
ables. The nal two rows show some additional information on shape of the indi¤erence
curves, namely the willingess-to-pay (WTP) for being in perfect health and for not being
unemployed. The higher the WTP in a non-income dimension, the more the respondent
su¤ersfrom her imperfect outcome in that dimension according to her own opinion on
the good life. Individuals who obtain the best possible value in a non-income dimension,
have a WTP of 0 in that dimension.
In each cell of the table we report the average of the variable mentioned in its row
amongst the worst o¤ according to the well-being measure mentioned in its column. As a
reference, the unconditional sample averages are given in the rst column. All averages are
obtained after weighting with corresponding sample weights. Figures between brackets
refer to non-statistically-signicant di¤erences between the full sample average and the
average amongst the worst o¤ according to a particular measure at the 5% signicance
level.
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Several observations from Table 2 are worth noting. We start by comparing the worst
o¤ according to the income measure WB1 with the sample averages (i.e., we compare
column 1 and 2). We see, for instance, that the average satisfaction score of the full
sample is 6.95 whereas the average score amongst the worst o¤ according to the income
measure score is only 5.80. Average household disposable income is only slightly above
one third of the average income in Germany while the di¤erence between the health index
of the worst o¤ according to WB1 and the full sample is rather small. Unemployment
gures, on the contrary, are about 5 times higher. When looking at the socio-demographic
characteristics in the next part of the table, one sees that the worst o¤ according to the
income measure are less likely to be living together with a partner, while they are more
likely to be divorced or to live in a single parent household. The worst o¤ according to
the income measure are more often non-German, and more often living in East Germany.
A nal nding is the low educational level of the worst o¤ according to WB1.
Next, we focus on the portrait according to the composite well-being index, WB2.
When comparing the rst two measures of well-being, it can be seen that the worst o¤ are
richer, less healthy and more likely to be unemployed according to the composite index
compared to income, which reects the impact of including health and unemployment
in the well-being measure. In particular the large share of unemployed among the worst
o¤ (about 70%) is striking. When investigating the socio-demographic variables, we nd
again an over-representation of the divorced and single parent families compared to the full
sample. A much larger proportion of disabled people is identied as worst o¤ compared
to the income well-being measure.
The third measure relies on the subjective well-being assessment of the individuals,
WB3 and o¤ers a quite di¤erent picture. The worst o¤ are richer and less likely to be
unemployed compared to the former two well-being measures. Yet, the average health of
the worst o¤ is comparable to the previous measure as is the share of people su¤ering a
disability. The educational level of the worst o¤ is better than when using the previous
measures and only slightly worse compared to the full sample. With respect to the per-
sonality traits, the worst o¤ according to self-reported life satisfaction report lower levels
of control over their life and have a more negative attitude towards themselves compared
to the former two well-being measures and also the full sample. This nding illustrates
the importance of personality traits as determinants of life satisfaction. We also nd con-
siderable di¤erences when it comes to the a¤ect variables. Unsatised people feel more
often sad and less often happy. As discussed above, however, it is hard to disentangle
whether we obtain this result because the respondents give a large weight to a¤ects as
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dimensions of their life, or whether respondents do not distinguish the questions about
a¤ects and cognitions.
Fourth, we discuss WB4, the preference-based equivalent income measure. Again a
di¤erent picture emerges. The worst o¤ according to the equivalent income measure are
in much worse health compared to the earlier measures. More than half of the worst o¤
report to be disabled, which is almost a doubling with respect to the composite index and
even more than three times as much as in the full sample. Remarkable is also the large
number of widowed individuals and pensioners. The average age of the worst o¤ is 62
years, more than 10 years older than the worst o¤ according to the composite index. The
reader may be wondering why the di¤erences between the equivalent income measure and
the composite index are so pronounced, as the same three dimensions are considered in
the analysis. The penultimate row of Table 2 sheds some light on this puzzle. One sees
that the worst o¤ according to the equivalent income measure are willing to pay much
more to be in perfect health compared to the worst o¤ according to the composite index.
This is intuitive as the equivalent income measure takes account of the preferences of the
individuals. Given the large coe¢ cient of health and the concave transformation of health
(recall that the Box-Cox parameter of health is 0.233), unhealthy individuals are willing
to give up a large part of their income to be in perfect health, which is reected in the low
health of the individuals identied as worst o¤. Many pensioners are identied as worst
o¤ due to a higher prevalence of health problems at older ages. The average WTP for
not being unemployed among the worst o¤ with the equivalent income measure is lower
compared to the composite index, since pensioners cannot be unemployed and are on the
reference value by denition.
Finally, we considerWB5, the well-being measure based on the vNM utility function.
This measure is based on the same ordinal preferences underlying the equivalent income
measure. Most of the characteristics of the worst o¤according to both measures are there-
fore quite similar. Recall that we have used an additional concave transformation for the
group of respondents that are not willing to take much risk. The role of this transfor-
mation is clear when looking at the bottom row of the socio-demographic characteristics.
The worst o¤ according to the last well-being measure are clearly more willing to take
risks. This nding is in line with the e¤ect shown in Figure 2, where (for the same vectors
of life aspects) the risk neutral individuals are worse o¤ compared to the risk averse ones
(our robustness checks show that when choosing a more concave vNM utility function
transformation for the risk averse respondents, the willingness to take risks among the
worst o¤ increases further).
In sum, our inspection of the characteristics of the worst o¤ highlights that di¤erent
socio-demographic groups are identied as worst o¤ with the di¤erent measures. Broadly
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speaking, we nd that the worst o¤ according to the income measure are more likely to be
low educated, unemployed individuals who are living without a partner. The composite
index gives a relatively large weight to unemployment so that more than two-thirds of the
worst o¤are unemployed. The individuals with a low life satisfaction are on average almost
as rich as the full sample but have a more negative attitude towards themselves and are
more often sad and less often happy. The equivalent income measure identies unhealthy
people as worst o¤, which results in an overrepresentation of pensioners and people with
a disability among the worst o¤. Finally, the worst o¤ according to the measure based on
vNM utilities are similar to those under the equivalent income measure, but are willing
to take more risks.
4.2 Overlap between the worst o¤
We have seen that substantial socio-demographic di¤erences exist between the individuals
identied as worst o¤ according to the ve di¤erent well-being measures. We complement
these ndings by discussing the extent to which there is overlap between the groups of
individuals identied as worst o¤ according to the di¤erent measures.
In Table 3, the ve columns in the middle part correspond to the ve well-being
measures. According to each measure an individual can be classied either as belonging
to the worst o¤ or not. This gives us 25 = 32 possible combinations, which are listed in
the rows of the table. In each row a checkmark indicates the combinations in which an
individual is considered as worst o¤. The last column shows the percentage of the sample
for which this combination occurs (taking sample weights into account).
We start by computing the percentage of individuals who do not belong to the worst
o¤ according to any of the well-being measures, which amounts to 75.59% (not reported
in the table). Contrarily, that implies that more than 24% of the sample are classied as
worst o¤ according to at least one of the ve well-being measures. This relatively large
number suggests a low degree of overlap between the well-being measures. In the rst
ve rows of Table 3, we show the percentage of all individuals that are identied by at
least one particular measure as being worst o¤. For all measures, this gives the selected
percentage of worst o¤, i.e., 9.2%.
The next group of rows in Table 3 shows the number of people that are identied as
worst o¤ according to at least two specic well-being measures. If all measures identied
exactly the same group of individuals as being worst o¤, we would observe also 9.2% in
each of these rows. However, as one can see, percentages are considerably lower. In most
cases, they are well below half, except for the pairwise overlaps between the composite
index, the equivalent income measure and the measure based on the vNM utility function,
27
with the highest percentage for the latter two. When looking further down the table at
the overlap of three measures, we see again that the overlap is highest for these three
measures (4.6%), which means that about half of the worst o¤ according to any of these
three measures are also identied by the other two measures as belonging to the worst
o¤. The overlap between four measures is never larger than 2%. Finally, we observe that
only 0.87% of the individuals are identied as worst o¤ according to all measures.
[Table 3 about here]
4.3 Re-ranking between the well-being measures
In this section, we broaden the picture to the full sample and visualize the degree of
re-ranking between the di¤erent well-being measures . We do so by providing in Figure 3
scatter plots of the rank of the individuals (the percentile to which they belong) according
to each pair of well-being measures. To visualize overplotting of di¤erent observations, we
use a so-called sunowerscatter plot in which each point has a number of leaves equal to
the number of observations in that point. If all points are situated on the diagonal, there
is no re-ranking. The more spread-out the plots are, the more re-ranking takes place. To
quantify the overall degree of re-ranking, we provide also the Spearman rank correlation
coe¢ cient r below each scatter plot (all correlation coe¢ cients are signicant at the 1%
level).
The top left hand panel of Figure 3 plots the rank according to income (WB1)
against the rank according to the composite well-being index (WB2). One sees that the
sunowers are spread out on almost the entire graph, with some concentration around
the diagonal. This highlights some re-ranking between these two well-being measures (the
Spearman rank correlation coe¢ cient equals 0:51): No observations are found in the top
left hand part of the graph, however. This is intuitive, as it is impossible for income poor
individuals to reach top ranks according to the composite well-being index that contains
income as one of its three components.
The next panel in the top right hand corner of Figure 3 shows much more re-ranking.
It plots the income ranks against the ranks according to life satisfaction (WB3). To
allow a graphical representation, we use the ranks of a latent continuous life satisfaction
measure that is consistent with the observed discrete responses. As we saw in the previous
section, the overlap between the worst o¤ identied according to these measures is low
(2:04%, see Table 3). In this panel, we see that this low degree of overlap between the
measures extends to the entire sample (the Spearman rank correlation coe¢ cient equals
only 0:25):
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The plots of the income rank against the rank according to equivalent income (WB4)
and the measure based on the vNM utility function (WB5) on the next row of Figure 3,
are again similar to the top left hand panel with comparable Spearman rank correlation
coe¢ cients. The next scatter plot, with the rank according to the composite well-being
index on the horizontal axis and the life satisfaction rank on the vertical axis is again
similar to the spread out plot in the top right hand corner between the income and life
satisfaction ranks.
The next two scatter plots (between the composite index and both preference based
well-being measures) have a distinctive shape, which resembles a hockey stick. The
amount of re-ranking is found to be low with a strong concentration around the diagonal
(the Spearman rank correlation coe¢ cients are larger than 0.9), except for the individuals
found in the bottom percentiles according to the composite index, who are scattered in the
rst ve deciles according to the equivalent income and the measure based on the vNM
utility function. All these individuals are unemployed. As the weight of unemployment is
larger in the composite index than in the other multidimensional measures, all unemployed
individuals are bottom ranked according to the composite index, whereas this is much less
the case for the preference-based measures which give more weight to health and income.
This nding is consistent with the high unemployment rate among the worst o¤ according
to the composite index, found in Table 2. Yet, it suggests that there would be even more
overlap between these three measures when a larger group of worst o¤ was considered
than is currently used to construct Table 3. A closer inspection of the scatter plot of the
ranking according to the composite well-being index and the measure based on the vNM
utility function shows that the right-hand side of the plot is somewhat separated into two
parts, one above and one below the diagonal. This is due to our splitting of the sample in
two groups based on their willingness to take risks. As shown in Figure 2, the risk averse
individuals obtain a higher well-being than the risk neutral ones for a given vector of life
aspects.
The next two graphs show the re-ranking when the rank according to life satisfaction
is put on the horizontal axis and a preference based measure on the vertical axis. Both
scatter plots look very similar to the top right hand graph. This nding illustrates once
more that the ranking according to life satisfaction is substantially di¤erent from the
other methods.
The nal scatter plot, in the bottom right hand corner, shows the re-ranking between
both preference-based well-being measures. Recall that both measures are based on the
same ordinal preferences, but use a di¤erent way of cardinalizing them. The ranking
coincides at the top and bottom of the well-being distribution, but there is considerable
re-ranking around the median. This is intuitive, as the scope for re-ranking due to the
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di¤erent cardinalization of the heterogeneous ordinal preferences is largest around the
median. Each of the stripes on the graph reects a di¤erent combination of risk attitude
and membership of a socio-demographic group.
Our ndings in this nal section highlight the substantial amount of re-ranking that
occurs in the full sample between the di¤erent well-being measures. These ndings are
consistent with the earlier analyses focussing on the bottom part of the well-being distrib-
ution. In particular life satisfaction ranks the individuals considerably di¤erent compared
to the other measures.
[Figure 3 about here]
5 Conclusion
We have illustrated once more that measurement matters. We have compared ve well-
being measures: income, a composite well-being index, subjective well-being, equivalent
income, and a measure based on individual vNM utility functions. We discussed the
information requirements of these measures and have illustrated how they can be applied
on a cross-section of a single data set, the German SOEP.
Our results show that the measures identify individuals with substantially di¤erent
socio-demographic characteristics as worst o¤. Moreover, the overlap between the worst o¤
according to some of the measures is low. Clearly, more research is needed to understand
better the empirical consequences of choosing a particular well-being measure. It remains
an open question, for instance, how generalizable our illustrative ndings are. Moreover,
even with a state-of-the-art data set as the SOEP, our analysis remained rather broad-
brushed, covering only three aspects of life. Collecting richer data sets of a high quality will
be essential to foster further development in the eld of empirical well-being measurement.
Yet, our ndings have potentially far-reaching policy implications when it comes to
the design of social policies that involve some kind of targeting or redistribution. A policy
maker who wants to take the idea seriously that well-being is a multidimensional notion,
and who wants to work with a single well-being measure to take account of the potential
correlation between the dimensions, will sooner or later face the challenging question
which well-being measure to use. We have illustrated some of the real-world implications
of this question when it comes to identifying the worst o¤.
Some well-being measures were relatively straightforward to implement (life satisfac-
tion and income information was readily available in the data set), other measures required
econometric estimations (the indi¤erence maps for the preference-based approaches), or
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parameter calibrations (the composite well-being index and the curvature of the vNM
utility function). Whether or not these extra e¤orts are worthwhile depends largely on
the normative appeal of the measures. Personally, we believe that the additional estima-
tions to retrieve information on the opinions on the good life of the concerned individuals
are not only worthwhile, but also necessary to arrive at attractive interpersonal well-being
comparisons.
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Table 1: Life satisfaction regression
income 0.150** (0.0563)
health 0.674* (0.319)
unemployment -0.575*** (0.0680)
income  partner 0.0247*** (0.00617)
income  male -0.0178*** (0.00390)
income  non-midlife 0.0202*** (0.00514)
Box-Cox parameter income 0.114* (0.0459)
Box-Cox parameter health 0.233* (0.115)
age -0.0344*** (0.00750)
age squared 0.000366*** (0.0000692)
higher education 0.0941** (0.0305)
divorced 0.00629 (0.0583)
separated -0.0371 (0.0988)
widowed -0.0411 (0.0680)
control over life 0.144*** (0.0107)
achieved what deserved 0.0745*** (0.00815)
positive attitude 0.332*** (0.0124)
constant -2.331* (0.980)
N 14,027
pseudo R2 0.1007
Regional dummies included. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
non-midlifedenotes an age below 45 or above 60 years.
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001.
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP 2010.
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Table 3: Worst o¤ overlap across the di¤erent well-being measures
poor according to: WB1 WB2 WB3 WB4 WB5 %
income comp. ind. satisfaction equiv. inc. vNM util. overlap
1 measure X 9.20
1 measure X 9.21
1 measure X 9.20
1 measure X 9.20
1 measure X 9.21
2 measures X X 3.79
2 measures X X 2.04
2 measures X X 2.77
2 measures X X 2.43
2 measures X X 2.72
2 measures X X 5.02
2 measures X X 4.78
2 measures X X 3.17
2 measures X X 2.77
2 measures X X 7.36
3 measures X X X 1.31
3 measures X X X 2.26
3 measures X X X 1.17
3 measures X X X 2.02
3 measures X X X 1.02
3 measures X X X 2.15
3 measures X X X 2.01
3 measures X X X 1.90
3 measures X X X 4.59
3 measures X X X 2.54
4 measures X X X X 1.01
4 measures X X X X 1.91
4 measures X X X X 1.85
4 measures X X X X 0.94
4 measures X X X X 0.91
all measures X X X X X 0.87
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP 2010.
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Figure 3: Re-ranking between each pair of considered well-being measures
41
Recent titles 
CORE Discussion Papers 
 
2014/9 Lionel ARTIGE, Antoine DEDRY and Pierre PESTIEAU. Social security and economic 
integration. 
2014/10 Mikhail ISKAKOV, Alexey ISKAKOV and Alexey ZAKHAROV. Equilibria in secure 
strategies in the Tullock contest. 
2014/11 Helmuth CREMER and Pierre PESTIEAU. Means-tested long term care and family transfers. 
2014/12 Luc BAUWENS, Lyudmila GRIGORYEVA and Juan-Pablo ORTEGA. Estimation and 
empirical performance of non-scalar dynamic conditional correlation models. 
2014/13 Christian M. HAFNER and Arie PREMINGER. A note on the Tobit model in the presence of a 
duration variable. 
2014/14 Jean-François CARPANTIER and Arnaud DUFAYS. Specific Markov-switching behaviour for 
ARMA parameters. 
2014/15 Federico GRIGIS DE STEFANO. Strategic stability of equilibria: the missing paragraph. 
2014/16 Claudio TELHA and Mathieu VAN VYVE. Efficient approximation algorithms for the 
economic lot-sizing in continuous time. 
2014/17 Yukai YANG. Testing constancy of the error covariance matrix in vector models against 
parametric alternatives using a spectral decomposition. 
2014/18 Koen DECANCQ, Marc FLEURBAEY and Erik SCHOKKAERT. Inequality, income, and 
well-being. 
2014/19 Paul BELLEFLAMME and Martin PEITZ. Digital piracy: an update. 
2014/20 Eva-Maria SCHOLZ. Licensing to vertically related markets. 
2014/21 N. Baris VARDAR. Optimal energy transition and taxation of non-renewable resources. 
2014/22 Benoît DECERF. Income poverty measures with relative poverty lines. 
2014/23 Antoine DEDRY, Harun ONDER and Pierre PESTIEAU. Aging, social security design and 
capital accumulation. 
2014/24 Biung-Ghi JU and Juan D. MORENO-TERNERO. Fair allocation of disputed properties. 
2014/25 Nguyen Thang DAO. From agriculture to manufacture: How does geography matter ? 
2014/26 Xavier Y. WAUTHY. From Bertrand to Cournot via Kreps and Scheinkman: a hazardous 
journey. 
2014/27 Gustavo BERGANTIÑOS and Juan MORENO-TERNERO. The axiomatic approach to the 
problem of sharing the revenue from bundled pricing. 
2014/28 Jean HINDRIKS and Yukihiro NISHIMURA. International tax leadership among asymmetric 
countries. 
2014/29 Jean HINDRIKS and Yukihiro NISHIMURA. A note on equilibrium leadership in tax 
competition models. 
2014/30 Olivier BOS and Tom TRUYTS. Auctions with prestige motives. 
2014/31 Juan D. MORENO-TERNERO and Lars P. ØSTERDAL . Normative foundations for equity-
sensitive population health evaluation functions. 
2014/32 P. Jean-Jacques HERINGS, Ana MAULEON and Vincent VANNETELBOSCH. Stability of 
networks under Level-K farsightedness. 
2014/33 Lionel ARTIGE, Laurent CAVENAILE and Pierre PESTIEAU. The macroeconomics of PAYG 
pension schemes in an aging society. 
2014/34 Tanguy KEGELART and Mathieu VAN VYVE. A conic optimization approach for SKU 
rationalization. 
2014/35 Ulrike KORNEK, Kei LESSMANN and Henry TULKENS. Transferable and non transferable 
utility implementations of coalitional stability in integrated assessment models. 
2014/36 Ibrahim ABADA, Andreas EHRENMANN and Yves SMEERS. Endogenizing long-term 
contracts in gas market models. 
2014/37 Julio DAVILA. Output externalities on total factor productivity. 
2014/38 Diane PIERRET. Systemic risk and the solvency-liquidity nexus of banks. 
 
 
Recent titles 
CORE Discussion Papers - continued 
 
2014/39 Paul BELLEFLAMME and Julien JACQMIN. An economic appraisal of MOOC platforms: 
business models and impacts on higher education. 
2014/40 Marie-Louise LEROUX, Pierre PESTIEAU and Grégory PONTHIERE. Longévité 
différentielle et redistribution: enjeux théoriques et empiriques. 
2014/41 Chiara CANTA, Pierre PESTIEAU and Emmanuel THIBAULT. Long term care and capital 
accumulation: the impact of the State, the market and the family. 
2014/42 Gilles GRANDJEAN, Marco MANTOVANI, Ana MAULEON and Vincent 
VANNETELBOSCH. Whom are you talking with ? An experiment on credibility and 
communication structure. 
2014/43 Julio DAVILA. The rationality of expectations formation. 
2014/44 Florian MAYNERIS, Sandra PONCET and Tao ZHANG. The cleaning effect of minimum 
wages. Minimum wages, firm dynamics and aggregate productivity in China. 
2014/45 Thierry BRECHET, Natali HRITONENKOVA and Yuri YATSENKO. Domestic 
environmental policy and international cooperation for global commons. 
2014/46 Mathieu PARENTI, Philip USHCHEV and Jacques-François THISSE. Toward a theory of 
monopolistic competition. 
2014/47 Takatoshi TABUCHI, Jacques-François THISSE and Xiwei ZHU. Does technological progress 
affect the location of economic activity? 
2014/48 Paul CASTANEDA DOWER, Victor GINSBURGH and Shlomo WEBER. Colonial legacy, 
linguistic disenfranchisement and the civil conflict in Sri Lanka. 
2014/49 Victor GINSBURGH, Jacques MELITZ and Farid TOUBAL. Foreign language learnings: An 
econometric analysis. 
2014/50 Koen DECANCQ and Dirk NEUMANN. Does the choice of well-being measure matter 
empirically? An illustration with German data. 
 
Books 
 
V. GINSBURGH and S. WEBER (2011), How many languages make sense? The economics of linguistic 
diversity. Princeton University Press. 
I. THOMAS, D. VANNESTE and X. QUERRIAU (2011), Atlas de Belgique – Tome 4 Habitat. Academia 
Press. 
W. GAERTNER and E. SCHOKKAERT (2012), Empirical social choice. Cambridge University Press. 
L. BAUWENS, Ch. HAFNER and S. LAURENT (2012), Handbook of volatility models and their 
applications. Wiley. 
J-C. PRAGER and J. THISSE (2012), Economic geography and the unequal development of regions. 
Routledge. 
M. FLEURBAEY and F. MANIQUET (2012), Equality of opportunity: the economics of responsibility. 
World Scientific. 
J. HINDRIKS (2012), Gestion publique. De Boeck. 
M. FUJITA and J.F. THISSE (2013), Economics of agglomeration: cities, industrial location, and 
globalization. (2nd edition). Cambridge University Press. 
J. HINDRIKS and G.D. MYLES (2013). Intermediate public economics. (2nd edition). MIT Press. 
J. HINDRIKS, G.D. MYLES and N. HASHIMZADE (2013). Solutions manual to accompany intermediate 
public economics. (2nd edition). MIT Press. 
 
CORE Lecture Series 
 
R. AMIR (2002), Supermodularity and complementarity in economics. 
R. WEISMANTEL (2006), Lectures on mixed nonlinear programming. 
A. SHAPIRO (2010), Stochastic programming: modeling and theory. 
